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ABSTRACT 
A large Californii'l.-tased Cvulpv.ter and electronics 
manufacturer is currently consolid~t~ng its Information 
Technology Centers. This thesis addresses the problems the 
company is experiencing with implementi.ng the consolidation 
and developing the chargeback sche~e wh~c~ will be used. The 
Department of Defense (DOD) is curreuLl~ consolidating its own 
data processing centers and instit:.;,·-:Lng a fee- for-service 
(chargeback/cost recovery) policy. Th~3 thesis will highlight 
some of the problems DOD may enc~1nteT in instituting its own 
cost recovery policies and other m;4jo·· organizattonal change. 
This thesis addresses the compaDy' s chargeback dilemma by 
first ano.lyzing the strengths and W!'~:~:~~nesses of several common 
chargeback techniques . It then critically evaluates the 
process by which the company is managing the transition and 
the method it is using to institute its chargeback policy. 
Finally, the thesis discusses the lessons DOD can learn from 
this study of the private sector approach to charg~back . 
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This thesis' objective is to analyze the chargeback 
decisions made by a large Califm:nia-based computer and 
electronics manufacturer which has recently decided to 
consolidate its Information Technology (IT) services. This 
analysis is being done in an effort to derive lessons learned 
from which the Department of Defense (DOD) can benefit. At 
the company's :;:·equest, both the company's name and descriptive 
details have been changed to ensure confidentiality. 
DOD is curre1:tly implementing its own IT center 
consolidation. Defense Management Review Decision (DRMD) 918 
has directed the Department of Defense to consolidate the 
military services' dat.:a processing centers and software design 
activities under the Defense Information System Agency (DISA) . 
When the consolidation is complete, DISA will provide 
Information Tei:hnology (IT) services to the military on a fee-
for-service (chargel1ack) basis. (En.dose, 1992, p.6) The 
analysis which follows will highlight some of the problems 
which DOD may encrmnter in instituting its own 
fee-for-service policy. 
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B. METHODOLOGY AND RESEARCH QUESTIONS 
Background information for this analysis was gathered 
using three methods: 
• Two site visits 
• Several telephone interviews with key company personnel 
• A review of the literature pertaining to the company and 
its philosophy 
The purpose of the first site visit was to conduct a semi-
structured interview with the company's Corporate Network 
Ser.rices to learn more about the orgi:inization and determir..e 
whether a valid research opportunity existed. The second site 
visit involved an extensive semi-structured/open-ended 
inte:rview with the company's Internal Change Consultant. This 
interview focused on the data center consolidation which is 
the subject of this thesis. The Internal Change Consultant 
discussed the details of the consolidation, the difficulties 
the company was encountering, and the steps tte company was 
taking to facilitate the change. 'Ehe Consultant also provided 
a confidential company 11 whitet.;aper 11 concerniDg the 
consolidation. A secondary focus of this interview was the 
company's corporate culture. The Consultant described the 
company's approach to doing business and conducted a tour of 
the headquarters building. 
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'The telephone interviews were conducted following the site 
visits. The Corporate Network Services Manager and the 
Internal Change Consultant were interviewed for the purpose of 
clarifying the information conveyed in the face-to-face 
i~terviews discussed above. Additionally, the Corporate 
Information Services Comptroller was interviewed extensively 
concerning the company's efforts to establish its chargeback 
policy. These semi-structured/open-ended intervi~ws consisted 
of questions concerning the process by which the chargeback 
policy was being established, the company's chargeback 
objectives, and the chargeback decisions the company had 
already made. 
The stucty is designed to answer the tallowing research 
questions: 
• What difficulties is thE~ company encountering in its 
consolidation efforts? 
• What objectives does the company hope to accomplish with 
its chargeback policy? 
~ What chargeback methods do2s the 
• What objectives do these methods accomplish? 
• How have other organizations solved their own chargeback 
dilerrmas? 
•Which of the company's chargeback policy objectives are 
accomplished by the current chargeback methods? 
• Are there aspects of change management theory which might 
help the company overcome the difficulties it is 
encountering with its consolidation? 
• What can DOD lP.arn from the company's experience;· 
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C. ORGANIZATION OF STUDY 
This chapter describes the thesis' purpose, its relevance 
to DOD, and the research questions which will be addressed. 
Chapter II discusses data processing chargehack and the 
obj ect:i.ves it can accor.'.plish. Chapter III describes and lists 
the advantages and disadvantages of the basic c1·.argeback 
methods currently in use. Chapter IV outlines the transition 
the company is undergoing, the resistance it. is encountering, 
efforts to overcome the resistance, and some of the current 
thinking on managing change. Chapter V focuses on the 
company's effort to estal.Jlish its chargeba.ck policy. Chapter 
VI describes the chargeback policies adopted by other 
organizations. Chapter VII analyzes the charg2b&ck approach 
taken by the subject company. Chapter VIII concludes the 
thesis, discusses its relevance to DOD, and suggests areas for 
further study. 
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II. DATA PROCESSING CHARGEEACK 
A. INTRODUCTION 
A data DrocesRing chargeback system: 
accounts for who uses a company's computer res-Jurces and 
allocates the cost back to those users. Such a system 
calculates billing rates and monitors the use of IS 
services. It also reports to or bills customers according 
to their utilization or work volume (Butler, 1992, p.4cl). 
This chapter first analyzes the purposes thac a chargeback 
system can serve within an organization. Then iL discusses 
several criteria by which a chargeback system's effectiveness 
c=-u be judged. 
B. MANAGEMENT CONTROL 
Data processing chargeback is intended to accomplish 
manasement control. Management control is 11 t:he process by 
which managers influence other members of the organization to 
j mplement the organization's s'::rateg::..es, 11 (Anthony, 19 8 8, 
p.10) The control process consists of four steps. (Anthony, 
1988,p.8): 
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1. T~e organization sets its performance standards. 
2. The organization establishes a mechanism fur 
performing status checks (wh:h respect to 
the standard) and communicating them to a control 
unit. 
3. The control unit compares the status with the 
standard (i.e., the reality with the goal). 
4. If the standard and the status are different, 
corrective action is directed and taken. 
When data processing chargeback is instituted, the "standard" 
is usually the data processing budget and the mechanism for 
performing the status checks is the pricing strategy employed. 
Data processing chargeback uses both budget and pricing in an 
attempt to control resource use in the short-run and provide 
information to make resource decisions in the long-run. This 
thesis discusses alternati .re pricing st.rategies. To complete 
the management control discussion, this thesis should be 
augmented by a budget determination and a management control 
analysis. 
C. WHY ORGANIZATIONS CHARGE FOR DATA PROCESSING RESOURCE USE 
The first question which must be addressed in any 
discussion of data processing chargeback techniques is "Why 
charge users at all? Why not treat data processing expenses 
as corporate overhead and accumulate them in the same account 
as electricity and rent?" 
The primary reason most large organizations charge users 
for data processing resources is: 
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without some effective means of control, computing 
resources have a particularly strong tendency to be used 
ineffectively, while demand seems capable of growing 
without appareut limit. (Bernard, 1977, p.2} 
In addition to controlling data processing resource use, a 
well-designed chargeback system can serve several other 
purposes. 
D. WHAT CHARGEBACK CAN DO FOR AU ORGANIZATION 
1. Recover Costs 
Chargeback can accomplish cost recovery (Hill, 1979, 
p .13) . If an organization invests $200, 000 in ciata processing 
resources, it can charge its users $200,000 to recover its 
costs. 
2. Encourage User Cost Consciousness 
Users required to pay for data processing service 
typically evaluate their usage choices carefully (Sanders, 
1986, p.42-45). Being charged $100.00 for using a resource 
forces the user i.:.o consider whether he/she is receiving 
$100.00 worth of benefit from the resource's use. Perfo::::-ming 
this cost/benefit analysis prior to every usage deci:3ion 
transforms the user into an informed buyer, and also exerts 
pressure on the data processing supplier to p~ovide a quality 
product. 
3o Efficiently Allocate Resources 
Ideally, a well-designed chargeback system can 
achieve effective and efficient allocation of scarce data 
'7 
processing resources (Lin 1983, p. 9) . This can be 
accomplished by using a pricing structure which regulates 
demand and ensures that users who value the resource the most 
are able to obtain it in sufficient quantity. 
4. Communicate Management Policy 
In addition to ensuring both sufficient quality and 
quantity, an organization's chargeback policy can communicate 
management's goals and priorities to er ..1ployees. Suppose, for 
example, management wants employees to automate divisional 
accounting functions. One way to encourage this is to install 
accounting application software on the central computer and 
2.llc.N free access for the first six months. 
5 . Achieve Orgai1iza tional - individual Goal Congruence 
The chargeback policy, in tr.e above case free-usage 
for an accounting application, could modify users' behavior in 
a manner benef ic .i.al to the company as a whole. Thus an 
effective chargeback system ~an accomplish organizationc·.1-
individual goal congruence, an idaal situation in which 
decisions made tr i maximize the prof its of individual divisions 
also maximize the profit of the firm as a whole. (Eccles, p. 
27) 
6. Communicate User Needs 
In additio~ to achievin3 this congruence, a 
chargeback system can maintain and nurture a valuable 
connection betwc~en upper-level management and the end users. 
In many large organizatj ons, data processing services are 
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managed from the corporate offices, at a .level far removed 
from the individuals who use U·e system. When end users are 
both required to pay for the services and involved in the 
process which establishes the prices, their data processing 
needs are made known to management. The result is a corporate 
information service which satisfies the requirements of both 
upper management and end-users. 
7. Pro~ide Capacity Planning Information 
An effective chargeback system also allows upper 
management to do capacity planning (Sanders, 1986, p.42). If 
the usage levels tracked by the chargeback system indicate 
that demand exceeds su2ply, management can use this 
intormation to justity arJd.itiona.l equipment or adaitional 
staff. The data gathered by the chargeback system enables 
management to perform trend analyses and express t!1e rationale 
behind their decision in dollars and cents. 
E. CRITERIA FOR AN EFFECTIVE CHARGEBACK SYSTEM 
A poorly c::inceived chargeback scheme can adve;:-sely 
the organization which uses it (Hufnagel, Birnberg, 1989, p. 
415) . It can increase conflict among divisions, decrease 
employe8s' motivation to control data processing costs, and 





The fact that such accounting and statistical schemes are 
socially invented and vaJ.idated n1eans that they are more 
vulnerable to attack than c..n~ empirical referents, anG. 
leads to some importanc consequences for the behavior of 
individuals and groups within the organization (1967, 
p 5). 
The literature empi1asizes several criteria which a 
chargeback scheme must sa.tisfy to avoid dysfunctional 
consequences within an organization. 
l. Equitable (Hufnagel, Birnberg 1989) 
A chargeback system must appear fair to those affected 
by it. If the system appears to benefic one group at the 
expense of another, conflict between the two groups is 
inevitable. Fairness, though, is not an easy idea to 
operationalize. It is subjective and "context-dependent" 
(Hufnagel, Birnberg, 1989, p.423). What may seem fair to one 
group may seem grossly unjust to another. An organization's 
goal, then, must be to establi~h a chargeback policy wrich 
appears fair to as many personnel as possible - particularly 
in the areas cf pricing (prices should not exceed market 
prices) and exchange auconuu1y ( fJ:"eedom to buy services outside 
the organization) . Perceived fairness can be accornplished by 
including end-users in the process which determines the 
organization's chargeback policy. 
2. Understandable (Drury, 1982, pp.31-36) 
User.s must receive usage reports which are iLemized in 
terms they can understand. In reality, this is rarely the 
case. The typical usage report is itemized at a "level of 
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accounting (or data processing) sophistication that confounds 
its recipients" (Drury, 1982, p.32). This occurs because the 
personnel typically responsible for creating the chargeback 
scheme are accountants and data processors. 
A user who cannot understand a usage report cannot 
modify his usage behavior. An incomprehensible report thus 
prevents chargeback from accomplishing its primary objective: 
inodifying user behavior in support of organizational goals. 
Most of the current literature recommends against using 
compley billing algorithms such as the one depicted in Figure 
1. Instead, the recommendation is to use a natural billing 
unit (Alley, Willits, 1985). Examples of natural billing 
unit::; ;J.rc "number of invoices p::::-ocessed, '' "number of reports 
printed, " "rllunber of database queries processed," or 
"prog!:"a.mmer manhours used." The billing unit used must be 
meaningful to the organization being billed. For example, a 
department which processes orders should be billed for "orders 
processed." The advantage to basing a chai.·3eback scheme on 
natural billing units is that users can see a relationship 
between what they use and wh~t they pay. 
3. Controllable (Hufnagel, Birnberg, 1989, p. 423) 
Users must be able to control their data processing 
charges. 'I'hey should participate in thE process which 
determines the chargeback policy and they should be ch;'lrged 
only for data processing activities withiL their control. 
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4. Accurate, timely, flexible, realistic, and auditable 
(Schechinger, Prack, 1983, p.48-50) 
The chargeback system should be based on 
accurate accounts of usage, the user should be billed 
~egularly, and the chargeback policy should be flexible enough 
(but not fluctuate dramatically) to meet changing business 
needs. The charges should be realistic (i.e., reasonably 
close to market price) and auditable by outside agencies. 
5. Inexpensive to Administer and Maintain 
As will become obvious in the chapter which fallows, 
there is often a tradeof f between efficiency in data 
processing resource use a:1d the expense inherent: i.n 
adJ.ninistering a chargeback system. Chargeback methods which 
pr.omoLe efficient resource use (i.e., flexible pricing) are 
the most expensive for an organization to administer, while 
those which do not promote efficient resource use (i.e., fr~e 
allocation) cost little. 
12 
n 
AFj '-_ AC=1 +(TD*UCF) 
L ~""'1 
I > Uij*UCi 
\ , ... 1 
AC • A1.:count Charge 
k •Total Jobs Run using Computer Resources 
AFJ - Run Category Adjustment Factor 
n • Total re~ources used for a job 
Llij - Utilization of resources I by job j 
UCI - Unit Charge Rate for Resource i 
TD • Fiio Space Asslgnw to the Account In Track Days 
UCF • Unit Charge for File Space 
Figure 1: Navy Regional Data Center Billing Algorithm 
(Potter, 1986, p.46) 
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III. CHARGEBACK METHODS 
A. INTRODUCTION 
There are many different methods by which chargeback can 
be accomplished. A review of the current char.geback 
literature reveals three chargeback techniques frequently used 
for computer time: free allocation (no charge) 1 direct 
allocation (using "funny money") , and direct charge.back (using 
"hard money 11 ) • This chapter describes each method and 
discusses its advantages and disadvantages. Figure 2 wil 1 a id 



















Figure 2. Chargeback Methods (Lin, 1983, p.6) 
14 
£. C!IAR.GEBACK METHODS 
1. Free Allocation (Potter, 1986, p.33) 
Some organiza.tions resolve their chargeback dilerruna by 
not charging for computer resource use; computer resources are 
treated instead as free goods. Computer users consume as much 
of the data processing resource as Lheir circumstances 
require; the organization assigns the costs to its own 
overhead accounts a.nd "foots" the bill. 
There are many obvious disadvantages to not charging 
for computeL resources. 
they have no incentive 
If users are not required to pay, 
to make cost effective decisions 
concerning which 




For example, the 
jobs to run. Their 
This would have several 
users' high accumulated 
demand may create resource-use congestion which would reduce 
the computer's response time. It is possible too that users 
who value their jobs most highly may not get their jobs 
through. When jobs are not priced, there is no way for the 
computer to determine which jobs have the highest prioriLy. 
Even if the data service center requires users to assign 
priorities to their jobs, there is no incentive for users to 
reveal their true priorities unless they are required to pay 
more for jobs with a higher priority. 
Not charging for computer use has aEother drawback. 
It eliminates one of the pr:i.mary :r:-easons that computer 
15 
programmers write efficient code - to save computer time and 
hence money. If computer time costs nothing, why should any 
effort be made to conserve its use? 
Finally, management has no method of determining 
exactly their organization's data processing needs. When 
computer time is a free good, users are motivated to use all 
available capacity regardless of the value of their service. 
There is, however, one strong advantage an 
organization realizes when it treats data processing as a free 
good: the organization encourages computer use (Sanders, 
1986, p,43). Many organizations, having recently acquired a 
central computer, choose not to charge for computer time for 
this reason. During what Nolan (1979, pp.115-126) terms the 
initiation stage of data processing technology use, automation 
is introduced to an organization. Success during this phase 
requires that the technology find valuable uses. Users are 
more likely to identify valuable uses (i.e. functions which 
should be automated) when they are not charged for automated 
data processing use. 
Two additional advantages to free allocation are that 
it is equitable (i.e., all users are affected equally) and 
simple. This simplicity makes it easy to understand and 
inexpensive to administer (Hill, 1979, pl3). As will become 
obvious, many chargeback techi iques result in more efficient 
resource use. This benefit, hcwever, must be weighed against. 
the overhead cost required to administer them. 
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2. Allocation (Lin, 1983, p.7) 
The allocation chargeback method treats the computer 
resource as one of the organization's overhead expenses. 
Management or a computer steering committee ctecides how much 
money the organization will spend on data processing during a 
given time period. This amount is allocated to divisions 
within the organization. Each division is typically granted 
"funny money" equal to the cost of their share of the computer 
resource. This money can be spent only as "payment" for the 
data processing resource they use. 
The allocation method has many of the same advantages 
as the free good approach. It encourages use of the computer 
(at least up to the amount allocated) and it is predictable, 
understandable and easy to administer. 
A1 location shares many of free good' s disadvantages as 
well. Under allocation, there is little incentive to make 
trade-off decisions across users. Users simply consume up to 
the amount allocated and stop. This has the potential to 
create inefficiencies because users may have very different 
values for the least valued jobs processed. (The least valued 
jobs processed are those jobs for which the users' marginal 
value equals his marginal cost.) The overall value of the 
central computer could have been increased by shifting 
resources to the user with the highest incremental value. 
Unfortunately, with allocation it is difficult for management 
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to get a.ccurate information :r.:e:~arcling the relative value 
across users, unless the funny m0.)nC:!y is excha.nseci across 
divisions for other I8sources wlth q1antifiable values. 
Allocation can have second dysfuncti0nal 
consequence. If users ar:e not dl:!.oca te the amount of compuLer. 
time they need, a black n.arket "barter" system may be 
escablished t:.o accomplish redistribution As an example, 
suppose user A needs $100. 00 wol'.'tl. of con:putco,r time but has 
only been allocated $80.00. User B, on the other hand, ceeds 
only $60.00 war.th of computE:r tim"-', but has been allocaced 
$80.00. User A can offer: user B somet:i.ing (i.e., a good or a 
service) in exchange for user E's excess $20.00 of con~uter 
time, The time usen; ex.pend in r. inding each C't:.he:r:- and 
establishing this transaction is a real cost tu ti).e 
organization. 
3. Direct Chargeback (Lin, 19B3, pp.7-10) 
By far the most corcunon rnetnod of charging users for 
data processing services is direct chargebc~ck. With direct 
chargeback, each using departme!lt has it~ owu operating 
budget, and, within tbe constraints of this budget, spends its 
own money on data processing resources. For example, if 
department A has $500,000 to spend in fiscal yPar 1993, it can 
spsnd $200, 000 on data processing resources, $2CO, 000 on 
executive and clerical salaries and $100,000 on the Christmas 
party and coffee. 
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Direct char9eback employs the "hard rr.oney" concept 
(:v!cKinnon, Kallman, 19 8 7, p. 7) . Unlike "funny money" used 
with the allocation chargeback method, "hard money" can bE: 
spent for any resources the department needs to perform its 
function. 'I'his forces the departmr..:nt co make trade-off 
decisions concerning the allocation of its scarce budgetary 
resources (i.e., "we need more data processing this year, so 
I guess that means less coffee"). ~hen all departments are 
required to make these decisions, it can result in opsimal 
resm-,rce use throughout the organization, depending upon how 
prices arE detennined. The primary difference between the 
f ollCJwing direct chargeback scnE:!mes is the means by which 
prices are assi.gned to the computer resource. 
a. Profit-based Pricing (Ant11ony, 1988, Eccles, 1985, 
Lin 1983) 
With protit-based pricing, corr,puter resource prices 
are based upon the price the resources currently command on 
the open market. Each dep2.rtment witl'lin the organiza~ion is 
operated as an individual profit-center. A profit-center is 
a "responsibility center whose pe:::-forman.ce is measured as the 
difference between its revenues and its expenses or costs." 
(Anthony, 1988, p.64) Trw profit-c.:enter concept is most 
corrunonly employed in highly decentralized organizations 
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composed of departments or divisions responsible for 
manufacturing and marketing a single product line. 
Grganizations usually choose to operate individual 
divisions as profit-centers with one end in mind: they hope 
to motivate divisional managers to run the divisions as though 
they were their own small businesses. If there are no 
interdepartmental dependencies, this arrangement can create 
organizational-divisional goal congruence - an ideal situation 
in which decisions made at the divisional level are optimal 
for the firm as a whole. (Anthony, 1988, p.24) If, for 
example, a division manager's goal is to achieve a profit for 
his division, the manager will work to increase revenue and 
minimize costs. One way to accomplish both is to make 
efficient use of the organization's da.ta processing services. 
If every div~sional manager makes efficient usage decisions, 
the result wi 11 be efficient data processing service use 
across the organization. 
At the same time, the data processing division 
itself is creating its own profitable pricing strategy. In 
order !or profit-based pricing of data processing resources to 
effectively achieve this congruence, though, the organization 
must have a policy which pennits outsourcing (DiNardo, 1992, 
pp.169-172). A permissive outsourcing policy allows divisions 
within the organizativn to purchase data processing resources 
from outside vendors if outside service is better. This has 
the effect of placing the organization's internal source for 
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data processing resources in direct competition with the 
outside mark.et. lt also frees the firm from the need to 
establish a price for data processing resources. This price 
will instead. be determined by market forces. 
pricing. 
planning 
There are three distinct advantages to profit-based 
The first advantage is that it can provide capacity 
information. If a data center is not realizing a 
profit, that may indicate that th8 center has moLe processing 
capacity than is needed. The data center then has the option 
to either eliminate excess capacity or possibly make services 
available to the outside market. The second advantage is that 
it forces the organization's internal data processing source 
to p"t·ovide a superior product at a competitive price in order 
to stay in business. The third advantage is that the policy 
gives divisional manag·ers the freedom to choose between 
internal and external data processing resources. This freedom 
is vital in organizations using the profit·· center concept. As 
stated above, the a profit-center manager is evaluated by his 
division's profits. If managers are to have any control over 
this evaluation, they must be able to "exert significant 
influence over both revenues and costs." (Anthony, 1988, p.65) 
An organization which mandates internal sourcing for data 
processing resources takes away the manager's exchange 
autonomy - a significant element of managerial control. 
In spite of this fact, many organizations restrict 
')Utsourcing (Eccles, 1985, p. 32). One common ·eason data 
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processing outsourcing is prohibited is that cost-conscious 
management personnel feel compelled to recover the investment 
they have made in data processing resources (CIS Comptroller 
interview, 1993). They accomplish this by using a cost-based 
chargeback method (discussion follows) and prohibiting 
outsourcing. Outsourcing is prohibited, because the ''start-
up" costs for a data cent.er are high, and when these costs are 
distributed users must pay more than market price for a given 
service. 
A second reason some organizations prohibit 
outsourcing for data processing resources is long- standing 
corporate policy (Telephone Conversation, CIS Comptroller, 
1993). Many large corporations have a Corporate Information 
Services department which provides data processing services. 
Placing this department in direct competl.tion with external 
data processing vendors creates a problem with externalities. 
Externalities are "consequences of action that the 
actors don't take into account and that therefore don't 
infh1ence their decisions." (Heyne, p. 330, 1991) They arise 
when autonomous though interdependent divisions must. integrate 
and coordinate their actions. Suppose, for example, a 
der_,artment decides to contract with an application progranuner 
to design a database system. They select the application. 
programmer that offers the best price. Suppose later, another 
department fulfills the same requirement using the services of 
another database prograrruner who also offers the best price. 
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Chances are that the database programmers are not going to 
create systems which can share information. However, the two 
departments might need to do this at some poin~ in the future. 
The need to share information is not something department 
decision makers would take into account when they made their 
decisicns - they simply look fo~ the best price to enhance 
their own profits. In the long run, their narrow-sightedness 
may cost the organization money. If data sharing becomes 
necessary, more money will be spent to make the two systems 
compatible. 
Many companies avoid this type of externality problem 
by vesting a central department (i.e. Corporate Information 
St:!.LV.i.ce::o) w.i.Lh ::oule lJrucu.LemeuL. c1.uLhur.iLy. Du.i.u~ Lhi.~ 
eliminates the externality problem and allows the organization 
the realize "economies of scale, control, and coordination." 
(Birnberg, Hufnagel, 1989, p.424) 
b. Cost-based Pricing (Lin, 1983, p.B ) 
The alternative to market-based prices for data 
processing resources is to base the price on cost 
specifically, the company's cost in providing the resource. 
Cost-based pricing has several distinct advantages. It is 
simple, generally easy to administer, and meets the 
requirements of many government contracts ancl regulatory 
agencies. There are at least three methods of cost-based 
pricing: average cost pricing, standard cost pricing, and 
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flexibl8 pricing. Each method (discussed below) has 
disadvantages as well. 
(1) Average Cost Pricing (Lin, 1983, p.8). The 
average cost for a given level of data processing service is 
b3.sed upcn the following formula: 
Total Co~t Of Service 
Recorded Usage 
This cost per unit which is charged to departments based upon 
the number of units consumed. 
The primary auva.uLCi9t: Lo this method is that, 
in theory, it appears fair. {Schechinger, Prack, 1983, p.45) 
Users pay for what they use. This method also allows the data 
processing center to recov8r its costs. 
I'he disacvant.ages, though, are numerous. For 
E.xamp:e, it creates three inefficiencies. 'I'he first 
ineff L~ier1,~y ~.rises because users are charged average total 
rather ':.h&o ma.i::-ginal cost for data processing resource use. 
ro:.:: :::ff ·~cv:nc.:y, additional service should be provided as long 
as the benefit of additional service (marginal benefit) 
exce~ds the cc·~.,t of providing it (marginal cost) . Computer 
syst,::ms t:1pic::illy have high fixed and low variable costs 
(Prack, ~;:c!"'Chinger, 1983, p. 56). Therefore, for computer 
systems the cost for incremental use is low, and the average 
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total cost is greater than the rnargina.l cost. when the system 
is not used to capacity. Average cost pricing motivates users 
to deman~ s~.vice if their benefit is greater than its average 
total cost. As demonstrated in Figure 3, less is demanded at 
.:i.verage cotal cost ( QATC) than at the point of efficiency, 
(QMcl - where marginal cost ;.::quals der:nand (marginal benefit). 
QMC is the effici8nt point. The result is system resource 
under-utilization. 
I '---._.._ i 
I '--- ',, . ~ ~ate , _____ ------------------------------------~, , 
' .~-----, 
I ; I 
i 
I I 
Pmc :==-~------------·------- -----===--=~+-=-:.=~-:.:=~--· -· -· 
MC 
Qatc Qmc Q 
-~--------------------------------~~----~~-----' Figure 2. Average and Marginal Cost Curves 
To illuscrate this inefficiency, suppose that 
PATC equals five dollars and PMc equals one dollar. The data 
processing service center will charge users five dollars for 
a service. Unde.c average cost pricing, this is the point at 
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which the center breaks even. Users will seek alternatives 
(to the aervice) which cost $4.99 or less. They are willing 
to pay as much as $4.99 for an alternative to a servic0 which 
only costs the organization $1.00. This is the source of the 
inef:Liciency. 
A second disadvantage is that average cost 
pricing can encourage undesirable behavior from a resource 
management standpoint. As stated previously, computer 
operations have high fixed and low variable costs. As a 
result, average total cost decreases as usage increases and 
increases as usage decreases. The problem this creates for 
average cost pricing is obvious. The price of the resource 
rises as demand decreases and the higher price further reduces 
demand. Conversely, the price of the resource drops as demand 
increases and the lower price increases demand. Average cost 
pricing, therefore, motivates users to behave in exactly the 
opposite manner that efficient resource use dictates. 
The final inefficiency results because average 
costing does nothing to help ration usage for data processing 
during periods of excess demand. Users are charged the same 
fee regardless of the value or priority they assign to a 
requested task. If there are periods when demand exceeds 
capacity, the data processing center will not k:no'"' which 
requests to process first. 
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'.2) Standard Costing (Lin, 1986; McKinnon, Kallman, 
1987). Stand:1i cost pricing is based upon the same concept 
as average cost v: icing (cost of service C.ivided by total 
usage) . However, ~ ·.:a.ndard COS\: pricing is based on the 
projected (rather than retroactively determined) cost of 
service. The price chargec: per unit of the resource remains 
fixed throughout a given time period. 
Standard cost pricirg has the advantage of 
allowing users to plan and budget for data processing resource 
use. However, it uses projected average total cost (ATC). 
Hence, it creates the same inefficiencies as averagi=:. cost 
pricing. In addition, there is another distinct disadvantage. 
Unless it is based on very accurate estimates, one oi two 
things may happen. The users may pay more for their data 
processing resources than it costs the company to provide (if 
their actual usage is below the projected usage), or ~hey may 
pay less (if their actual usage exceeds the projected usage). 
In the latter instance, full cost recovery is not 
accomplished. 
(3) Flexible Pricing (Potter, 1985, p.37; Lin, 
19 83, p. 9) . Flexible pricing schemes are based on demand 
rather than cost. In this respect, they are fundamentally 
different from the cost-based techniques discussed above. 
Flexible pricing uses a technique called differential pricing. 
Differential pricing sets different prices for different tasks 
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depending upon their priority or the time of day they are 
accomplished. Differential pricing includes both peak load 
and priority pricing. 
Peak load pricing is used when shifts in data 
processing resource use are predictable. Peak load is defined 
as the period of highest demand fer data processing resources. 
Off-peak periods are periods of lesser demand. 
Peak load pricing attempts to efficiently 
allocate scarce data processing resources by distributing 
demand across time. This is accomplished by charging users 
more for resource use during periods of peak demand. The 
higher price encourages those users whose marginal benefit is 
less than the peak load cost to run their jobs during the ott-
peak periods when the prices are reduced. 
Priority pricing is used when shifts in data 
processing demand are not predict:able. With priority pricing, 
users are offered a choice of prices, each one corresponding 
to the priority their task will be assigned. When demand for 
the data processing resource exceeds supply, tasks with the 
highest priority (and the highest price) are processed first. 
Priority pricing improves efficiency in resource use by 
ensuring that resourceE; are available to users who value their 
tasks the most (i.~ .• those who are willing to pay the higher 
price). 
Peak load and priority pricing can satisfy many 
of the criteria for a successful chargeback scheme. One 
~8 
drawback, though, is that these flexible pricing techniques 
can be difficult and expensive to administer and maintain. 
Configuration changes which affect capacity can require 
corresponding changes to the pricing scheme. A second 
disadvantage is that flexible pricing can make budgeting 
difficult for users. When prices are subject to frequent 
change, planning expenditures can be impossible. A final 
disadvantage is that flexible pricing, because it is demand 
rather than cost based, may not allow a firm to recover its 
costs. 
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IV. THE COMPANY AND THE CHANGE 
A. INTRODUCTION 
Hypothetical Computers and Electronics (HC&E) I 
headquartered in San Mateo, California, is currently 
reorganizing its Corporate Information Services (CIS) . This 
chapter begins by describing the company and its corpc.. rate 
culture. The second part of the chapter discusses the CIS 
reorganization effort and the reasons personnel are resisting 
the change. Section F discusses the method the company is 
using to overcome resistance to the transition. Section G 
dese;ribes briefly some current ideas on managing change. Data 





(a confidential company 
literature); published 
reports; and interviews with HC&E' s Corporate Network Services 
Manager, Internal Change Consultant (referred to henceforth as 
the ICC), and CIS Comptroller. Data for the final chapter 
section were obtained from the consulting organization HC&E 
hired to help manage the change. 
B. HYPOTHETICAL COMPUTERS AND ELECTRONICS 
HC&E was founded 53 years ago by Dave Houston and Bill 
Pickford, two engineers educated at 




organization into an international company with 91,000 
employees and net sales in excess of 13 billion dollars. 
HC&E CORPORATE ORGANIZATION 
hieL,_ 





..Maasursmant_ .Computer__ __computer_____ .Corporalfl. ____ _ 
~ystems __ J>roduc:I$.._ _ -..Systoou __ ~Ol\'1ces __ _ 
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Electronics PC's Multiuser UNIX Information Services 1 
Microwave Handhelds HC&E 3000 Personnel J 
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Figure 4. HC&E Organizational Chart 
HC&E manufactures and markets 20, 000 ma.j or consumer 
electronic and computer products (HC&E Business Cverview, 
1989). The company is divided into four sectors, three of 
which concentrate on specific product lines. (See Figure 4.) 
The sectors are further sub-divided into divisions. Sector 
one .!- --------~,__,_ &-- ----'"'""""' ____ ._ .L:::> .Lt;:l:ll-'VH-=>.1 . .L.J.LC: .LUJ.. 1ll~O.DUJ..C:1LLC:HL systems, sector- two ,c _,._ L ._•L 
computer products, and sector three for computer syste:ms. J.'he 
fourth sector provides corporate services for HC&E employees. 
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C. HC&E CORPORATE CULTURE 
HC&,E' s corpora t:e r.ul ture is based on the 11 HC&E Way 11 
Hypothetical Computers defines the HC&E way as: 
a set of deeply held beliefs that govern and guide our 
behavior in meeting our objeccives and in dealing with 
each other, our customers, shareholders and othen3. (The 
HC&E Way, p. 1) 
These beliefs include: 
• the understanding that pecple want to do a good job, and 
"will do so, given the proper tools and support 11 (The HC&E 
Way, p. 1) 
• the promise of employment.: security 
• egalitarianism - management and the employees they 
receive the same benefits and work in the same 
office" conditions. Atmosphere is informal. 
(Management by wandering around) . 
• a strong climate of mutual trust 




• decentralization - organization based on small autonomous 
units each of which has its own profit/loss 
accountability (ICC interview, 16 October 1992) 
• particip:;i.tive management 
"d8mocrat.ic3.lly, " personnel 







• encouragement or flexibility and innovation 
D. THE 'l'RANSITICN 
Corporate Information Services ( CIS) ha.s been the target 
of HC&E's most recent efforts to reduce its internal 
organizational costs. Specifically, two proposed changes will 
affect the way HC&E manages jts inf0rmation technology (IT) 
resources. The first change is to realign the business and IT 
stra.tegies. IT is no longer being viewed as a cost to be 
subtracted from the "bottom line;" instead it is viewed as an 
"enabler" - a technology which can increase the organization's 
bottom line by improving· the w-a.y it does business (ICC 
interview, 16 October 1992). 
The second change is physically consolidating 3 O data 
centers into six. This consolidation is being undertaken for 
several reasons (T&M Lnformation Technology wnitepaper, 1992). 
The primary reason is that improvem12nts in neLwork technology 
and distributed processing capabilities make the power and 
efficiency of centrally located computers available to 
geographically and functionally separated divisions. A 
secondary but related reason is that consolidation permits 
HC&E to realize economies of scale. It costs less f o~ one 
large data center to perform a given function for a la~ge 
9-roup of people than it does for several small centers to 
perfornt the same function for several small groups of 
emplcyeef:l. HC~&E anticipates thig consolidation will save $2. 5 
million (~et present value) in data processing costs over the 
next five years. (T&:MLnformation Teclmology Whitepaper, 1992, 
p. 11) 
E. RESISTAJ.~CE TO CHANGE 
Most employees recognize that t.his change will save their 
sornpa.ny money. Nevertheless, management has encounte~ed 
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strong resistance to consolidation. (ICC interview, 16 Oct 
1992) Tbe sour.ces of this resistance are numerous. First, 
some employees ar2 threatened by potential job loss. For 
years, HC&E has prided itself on its 11 cradle-to-grave 11 
employment policy. The con~olidation, though, will make some 
11 lay-offs 11 necessary. Many IT employees also expected that 
working for HC&E would allow them to remain in one geographic 
area for life. The consolidation will require some empl'.Jyees 
to move; some of the relocations will geographically separare 
husband and wife eirlployees. 
The consolidations are als0 encountering resistance 
becanse of the "not - invented- here 11 syndrome. (ICC interview, 
16 October 1992) HC&E personnel have long bee~ accustom~d to 
using decentralized IT services they had designed to suit 
their division's needs. Now they are being required to use 
centralize'1 services which may not satisfy their unique 
requirements. 
HC&:E is art.ributina 
-- - - -- - - - mucb of the change 
resistance to human nature. (ICC interview, 16 October 1992) 
Human beings need to feel in control of their destinies, and 
a change imposed from above severely reduces this control. 
Most employees ari;;: "threatened by tbe greater ambiguity" and 
view the change as having "more costs than benefits." (ICC 
interview, 16 October 199~) 
HC&E's ICC attributes the change resistance to 11 counter-
cultural" method by which it was imposed. (See Section c for 
diocussion of HC&E' s corporate culture.) The decision to 
consolidate was made by tvp management; it was not arrived at 
"democratically. 11 The lay·· offs and involuntary relocationE 
have weakened the management/employee mutual trust. 
Centralizing IT services deprives the decentralized business 
units of some of their flexibility and autonomy - and affects 
the influence they have over their own "bottom-lines." 
F. PHILOSOPHY OF INTERVENTION 
In an effort to overcome the resistance to the 
consolidation, HC&E is using the MOC (Managing Organizational 
Change) change technology, a philosophy of intervention 
purchased from an extdrnal consulting organization ( 11 0DR 11 ). 
[This organization's address is given in the List of 
References.] The following description of their philosophy is 
based on information conveyed in ODR' s two-day course entitled 
"Managing Organizationa:;_ Cbange Implementation Planning 
Application." 
In the first phase, an organization, prompted by "pain," 
undertakes a change project and moves into the "transition 
phase." After this phase is. successfully negotiated, the 
organization applief:l the chosen "remedy" and then moves into 
its desired state. 
The t.enns this technology uses require further 
explanation. "Pain" is the discomfort people experience when 
exposed to information which justifies altering the status 
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quo. For most people, the status quo is comfortable. Unless 
they are presented with information which makes them 
uncomfortable, they have no incentive to change. Convincing 
people to move into the "transition phase" requires "pain 
management" - a process in which an organization selectively 
reveals information in an effort to generate discomfort 
sufficient that pe:Jple willingly leave the status quo. 
HC&E is currently in the transition phase. According to 
the MOC philosophy, an organization in the transition state 
exhibits the following characteristics: 
• low stability 
• increased conflict 
• abundant energy 
Successfully negotiating this unstable phase requires the 
organization concentrate its efforts in three areas: 
1. cultivating the change management skills of the 
change agent 
2. effectively managing the target resistance 
3. ensuring that the change project is culturally aligned 
Step one requires that HC&E select change agents and train 
them to perform step two. Step two requires first that the 
change agents identify 11 targets 11 (i.e. , those people whose 
work conditions will be changed) and then forecast the degree 
and source of their resistance. The MOC model identifies two 
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potential sources of resistance: ability deficiency and 
willingness deficiency. An ability deficiency exists when 
targets resist change because they do not believe that they 
will have the skills necessary to perform their new jobs. A 
willingness deficiency exists when the targets are opposing 
the change in spite of having been exposed to the facts on 
which top management based the decision. 
The technology recommends a different course of action for 
each ot the two reasons for resistance. For ability 
deficiency, change agents must ensure that cargets are 
sufficiently trained. For willingness deficiency, the model 
recommends penalizing the non-supportive behavior with 
whatever measures the company normally uses. Throughout this 
entire process, the change agents must focus on step three-
making sure that the change project is culturally aligned. 
This entails understanding what the targets' previous compc.l.ny 
experience has led them to expect and ensuring that their 
expectations are fulfilled. 
G. CB.ANGE THEORY AND OVERCOMING RESISTANCE TO CHANGE 
In comparison with HC&E' s change technology (discussed 
above) , the literature on managing major organizational change 
suggests that employees resiet. change for four reasons: 11 a 
desire not to lose something of value, a misunderstanding of 
the change and its implications, a belief that the change does 
not make sense for the organization, and a low toleran~~ for 
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change." (Kotter and Schlesinger, 1986, p.67) The literature 
also suggests several methods for overcoming change resistance 
(Kotter and Schlesinger, 1986, p. 70-74; Lawrence, 1954, 
p.195; Kanter, 1984, 674). These methods include: 
• Education and communication: educate affected personnel 
&"...iout the change before it happens and communicate the 
reasons behind the change; educate them to provide them 
with the skills necessary to function in the new 
environment. 
• J?a::ticipation and 'involvement: allow affected personnel 
the opportunity to participate in making change-related 
dP.clsions 
• Facilitation and support: allow affected ·~rsonnel the 
opportunity to openly discuss their 3e-related 
anxieties; provide them with comperi, tr.ion (more 
money/ti~e-·off) for extra workload created b 1 change 
• Negotiation and agreement: it possible, offer incentives 
to affected personnel, i.e. increased salaries following 
successful implementation of change 
There arf".: two strong similarities between the MOC 
philosophy and the change literature. The first similarity is 
that both approaches acknowledge that change resistance exists 
because empluyees Co ~.1oc appreciate the need for the chu.n3c. 
'The second similaric.y is that both approaches emphasize 
education and co11trr.unic;.c;:.ti.-:m. The MOC philosophy recommends 
providing !''---::.:·sonn.:;l with enough information that they are 
willing to leave the statm,1 quo. The change literature 
recommends c:Jmmunicating ~~-o f-'-~rsonr:-.el the reasons for the 
change. Both approaches also emphasize educating personnel to 
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ensure that they have the ability to function in the post-
change environment. 
There are three notable differences, though. One is that 
change literature reviewed for this thesis, did not 
specifically discuss the idea that personnel should be trained 
to manage change. The MOC philosophy is founded on the idea 
that managing change is a skill an employee can learn. The 
second notable difference is that the MOC philosophy 
recommends essenLially a punitive approach to willingness 
deficiency. The change literature, on the other hand, takes 
the more gentle approach and reconunends facilitation and 
support. 
A third notable difference between the MOC philosophy and 
the change literature is that the MOC philosophy emphasizes 
cultural alignment. The change literature reviewed for this 
thesis did not mention culture, although it did mention 
participation and involvement, ideas central to HC&E's 
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V. HC&E'S CHARGEBACK POLICY 
A. INTRODUCTION 
HC&E has decided to charge personnel for use of the 
consolidated :i:nformation Technology Centers (ITC' s) . This 
chapter describes the controversy surrounding the decision and 
the method the company is using to establish a chargeback 
policy. This chapter also outlines the chargeback objectives 
the company is using, the services each ITC will charge for, 
and the aspects of the chargeback policy thus far established. 
Data for this chapter are derived from two extensive and two 
short follow-up interviews with HC&E's CIS Comptroller. 
B. HC&E'S EXPERIENCE WITH CHARGEBACK 
One of the most thorny and most divisive issues 
surrounding HC&E' s consolidation effort is the chargeback 
policy. For the first time in HC&E's history, users are being 
required to transfer funds outside their divisions to pay for 
data processing services. Both the method by which the policy 
is being developed and the policy itself are being hotly 
contested by the four employee groups affected: data 
processing professionals, accounting personnel, division 
managers, and the end-users. 
HC&E's first step was to create an internal task force 
consisting of the four groups of personnel affected: data 
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processing, accounting professionals, man3.gers, and end-users. 
Afr.er the first few meetings, the company decided to excL..lde 
manag·ers and end-users from the task force because their 
presence made it impossible for the group to agree on a 
c:O.argeback policy. The resulting task force consisted only of 
data processors and accounting professionals. Their first 
task was to determine the chargeback policy's objectives. 
1. Chargeback Objectives 
Their consensus was that the chargeback policy should: 
1. Recover the company's data processing investment 
2. Enable customers to predict how much they will be 
charged for computer services 
3. Enable customers to realize savings through their 
actions (i.e., be controllable) using billings based on 
utilizat:i.on 
4. Create a part~ership between the customer and the ITC's 
which improves the efficiency of both (i.e., motivate 
efficient behavior using pricing structure) 
5. Be easily understood by all affected 
6. Appear equitable to all concerned 
7. Be flexible to accommodate changes in customer and 
business needs 
8. Charge prices which are competitive with the market 
price for the same service 
9. Provide capaciLy planning information 
10. Encourage competition among each of the six consolidated 
Information 'fe-:Jmology Centers (ITC's) 
11. Encourage use uf ITC services 
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The task force then had to agree on a standard 
definition for "servicP.." The ITC's provide many services; 
which ones should the user be charged for? Thus far the 
consensus among task force members is that. users should be 
charged for those services which they cannot provide less 
expensively within the organization for themselves. These 
services are: 
• Electronic mail 
• Access to on-line databases 
• Computer processing time (measured in CPU cycles) 
• Information storage space (measured in disk sectors) 
~Use of centrally available standard applications (e.g., 
HP's inventory and accounting systems) 
• New application development 
• Training and customer assistance 
2. Chargeback Policy Decisions 
After the above decisions were made, the task force 
began outlining its chargeback policy. Thus far, the 
following decisions have been made: 
• Users will. not be permitted to contract outside the 
organization for da~a processing services (i.e. , 
outsourcing will be prohibited) 
• Each of the six ITC's will be allowed to establish their 
own rates within the following parameters: 
- Rates charged must accomplish cost recovery 
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A differential pricing structure must be used which 
charges a lower rate for 5 day a week/8 hour a day 
access than 7 day a week/24 hour a day access 
- 80% of services provided should be standard and have 
a fixed price; the ocher 20% should be ''customized" 
services and have prices which are negotiated with 
the divisions on a case-by-case basis 
• Divisions will be permitted to purchase services from any 
of the six ITC's. 
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VI. ALTERNATIVE APPROACHES TO CHARGEBACK 
A. INTRODUCTION 
HC&E'S situation is not unusual. Tighter information 
system budgets have forced many organizations to consolidate 
data processing resources and charge for service use. 
This chapter first discusses one organization which has 
confronted chargeback issues similar to HC&E'S. The 
organization's solution will be discussed and then compared 
and contrasted with HC&E's approach, The second half of the 
chapter is a more general discussion of the approaches other 
organizations have taken to implementing chargeback. 
B. SPECIALTY PUBLISHING, INC. 
Hufnagel and Birnberg ( 1989) studied Specialty Publishing, 
Inc.'s (SPI) effort to revise its existing chargeback policy. 
1. The Company and Its Data Center 
SPI .1.S a !' corrirriunica tions 
specialized information and related services to health care 
professionals." (Hufnagel and Birnberg, 1989, p.420) SPI's 
data center employs 32 people and has a $3 million ye~rly 
budget. 
The data center has two computers. One computer 
provides word processing capabilities and the second, an IBM 
mainframe, supports the organization's general processing 
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requirements (maintaining client databases, printing mailing 
labels, etc.). SPI uses 90% of the first computer's capacity 
and only 40% of the second comput2r's. 
2. The Chargeback Environment 
SPI decided to dramatically change its chargeback 
policy. Prior to this decision, the company used a two step 
prosess to calculate user rates. First, a standard job 
accou!lting package was run to calculate the kind and amount of 
resources used by each job. Then, these resource amounts were 
nrultiplied by a fixed rate schedule to arrive at a final bill. 
The fixed rate schedule had been established "arbitrarily" by 
the data center supervisors and the rates were significantly 
below the mark.et price. (Hufnagel, Birnberg, 1989, p.421) Tll~ 
rates were also significantly below cost; the data center was 
operating "in the red." 
SPI's executive committee did not like the fact that 
the data center was not "breaking even." They were concerned 
about two additional problems as well: 
• users abusing data processing resources because they were 
not being forced to pay full cost 
• underutilization of the IBM mainframe 
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These concerns prompted them to: 
• implement a standard cost pricing scheme in which data 
processing costs would be projected in advance and charged 
out "equitably" to each of the divisions 
• prohibit purchase of computer services from outside 
vendors 
• require the MIS manager to sell computer services to users 
outside the organization in an effort to achieve full 
utilization ot data processing equipment 
These decisions were hotly-conte~Led by both the data 
center's manager and users. The manager believed that the new 
higher prices would inhibit users' attempts to experiment with 
the computer and find useful applications for data processing. 
He also believed that the discussions between department 
managers and cost analysts necessary to project the costs 
would create additional conflict within the organization. His 
primary concern, though, was that user:-:>' response and job 
turnaround time would suffer- b~cause the system they w~re 
using was also being used by outside organizations. 
The users were unhappy because internal prices were 
above market level and they were not being allowed to seek 
better price,e on the open market. The manager of one division 
decided to purchase personal computers in an e!:f ort to re-
establish control over his data rJro.:essing cos rs. The 
mana~1=.r of a second division formally pro':.88ced thE~ decision 
tc prohibit outso~rclng. Birnberg and Hufnagel noted that 
"non6 of the managers indicated that they planned to revi.ew 
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their ct;.rreut data processing activities to identify jobs that 
could be run less frequently or discontinued altogetYier." 
(Hufnagel, Birnberg 1989, p.422) 
3. Resemblance to HC&E 
SPI's experience with chargeback resembles HC&E's in 
several respects. Both cornpar..ies are in the midst of a 
tI·ansition. HC&E is consolicating i t.s ITC' s and requi:i.:ing 
users to 11 pay 11 for services for the first time and SPI is now 
requiring users to pay full cost. Users &nd inanagers within 
boLh companies are unhappy about the new pricing structures. 
Both companies are focusing on re..::overing data processing 
coots and both oryanizations hope that their chargeback 
scherne3 will encourCi.ge pers011nel to make cost-conscious 
d2cisions concerning data processing resol.Lrce use. 
Additional~y, both com~anies are using standard cust pricing. 
Finally, both companies have decided to prohibit outsourcing. 
4 Dif f~~ences from HC&~ 
One difference bet·.,ieen th.e -c.t&Jo compa11ies is chat HCF~E 
h~s state~ that one of its goals is to establish prices which 
are couipeti ti ve wi. th the market prices. SPI is cha·cging users 
prices which exce8~ the market price. Because SPI's divisions 
are evaluated a,3 r1ro~it centers (a co~cept discussed in 
Chapter III, Section 3a), managers are understandably 
~ibtressed about having lost the ability to purchase a needed 
servi~e at the lowest available cost. It ia interesting to 
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note too that one SPI manager decided to purchase personal 
computers to regcin control over his data processing costs -
a decision which may not have been ef f icicnt tram the 
company's viewpoint. (See discussion in Chapter III, Section 
3b ( 1) . ) 
A third difference is that SPI is requiring its data 
cente:i:- to sell its services on the open market. HC&E's data 
center servii:es are used only within the company. One 
int8resting question raised by SPI's requirement is: given 
the fact tl1at 11 full- cost 11 recovery is forcir,.g i:he data center 
to charge more than the market price for its services, how is 
it going to sell any of its services on ;:he open market? 
C. CHARGEBACK PRODUCTS 
Many companies use "chargeback products," installed 
computer software which performs various chargeback functions. 
There are currently about 30 of these products on the ma~ket 
(Butle~, 1992, p.50); the t- h Y"oo mr.c;, r 1""'lr.n11 1 ;:::i r ;:::i rP • '-""'~·-- ...... _ ... ,_ J:'-I:'~.---- ----
1. MICS Accounting and Chargeback: accounts for sys~em 
usage and c_lso accumulates data to assist in capacity 
planning, optimizdtion, and system tuning 
2. KOivlAiID III: accounts for system usage and also features 
a "Universal Charge Interface'' (UCI) which permits the 




3. CA-JAR.S/CA-PMA: mentioned most frequently in the 
literature, designed to be used by people with 
financial accounting backgrounds, shifts responsibility 
for implementing chargeback from data processing to 
financial accounting personnel 
D. OPPONENTS OF CHARGEBACK - SEARS MORTGAGE COMPANY 
Sears Mortgage Company located in Riverview, Illinois does 
not charge for use of its centralized data processing 
services. According to the Senior Vice President of 
Information Services, this policy is pursued for three 
reasons: 
• It is not Information Systems' job to control the business 
- IS should support the business 
• Chargeback encourages bad business decisions 
• Chargeback typically only accounts for machine usage, 
which is now only a small percentage of the company's data 
processing costs (Butler, 1992, p.49). 
The company instead uses a cost/benefit approach to data 
processing spending. The company' s cos L in providing the 
service is balanced against the benetits or savings the 
compaD.y realizes in using the service. 
According to Sidney Finehirsh, President of Compumetrics, 
Inc., a consulting firm specializing in the design of 
chargeback policies, Sears Mortgage Company is an excellent 
example of a company which should not institute chcirgeback. 
Finehirsh says that companies which should not use chargeback. 
should have: 
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• divisions which are geographically concentrated 
• a unifying corporate culture 
• personnel with the same goal (i.e., non-competitive 
divisions) 
• confidence in IS (Butler, 1992, p.52) 
E. CHARGEBACK IN AN ACADEMIC ENVIRONMENT - LAWRENCE/BERKELEY 
LABS (Butler, 1992, p.51) 
Lawrence/Berkeley labs located in Berkeley, California has 
a central computer facility used by scientists and engineers 
who model physical and chemical processes. The manager of the 
central facility, in an effort to use excess capacity, 
decided. to sell services to outside users. This additional 
use adversely affected both the system's jnb turnaround and 
interactive ·response time. The scientists and engineers 
responded by abandoning the central facility and purchasing 
their own small computers, thus making a decision which 
improved their individual situations but not the situation of 
the organization as a whol.e. 
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VII. ANALYSIS OF HC&E'S CHARGEBACK APPROACH 
A. INTRODUCTION 
This chapter is an analysis of HC&E's chargeback policy 
and the process by which it has been established. The 
analysis is based upon the theory and ideas described in the 
preceding chapters. The first part of the chapter is a 
general discussion of the strengths and weaknesses of HC&E's 
chargeback policy. The second part addresses the problems 
inherent in the chargeback goals the company has established. 
The third part discusses the implications of the policy 
decisions the company has already made. 
B. RC&E'S APPROACH: PRO'S AND CON'S 
1. Strengths 
HC&E' s approach to chargeb~.ck has one clear strength: 
its obj r~ctives. The company outlined them prior to 
~sta.blisl1in9 Ll1e policy iLselr:, a.nu 82.u. . :h 0bjt:;!1..:Live corre~punds 
to an objective or criteria listed in Chapter II. These 
objectives include, cost recov~ry, predictability, 
controllability, motivating efficient behavior, 
understandability, equitability, flexibility, achieving fair 
market prices, providing capacity planning .:'..nformat ion, 
encouraging competition, and encouraging use. If all ot the 
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objectives could be achieved, the result would be an "ideal" 
chargeback eystem. 
2. Weaknesses 
The primary weakness of HC&E's approach is that all 
the objectives cannot be achieved simultaneously. Some of the 
objectives can only be achieved at the ~xpense of others. 
This will be discussed in greater detail in Section C. 
Another weak point of HC&E' s approach is the process by 
which the company is establishing its policy. The task force 
consists only of data processing and accounting personnel. 
The two other groups which will be affected by the chargeback 
policy, end-users and division managers, have not been 
included. 
This exclusion is bound to have negative results. 
Excluding end-users and managers will make it impossible to 
achieve several of the company's chargeback goals. For 
example, goal five: "be easily understood by all affected," 
is unlikely to be achieved by a team composed of only data 
processors and accountants. Additionally, a chargeback policy 
which is difficult to understand will probably not achieve 
goal two: "enable customers to predict how much they will be 
charged tor computer services." 
Goal six: "appear equitable to all concerned" is also 
jeopardized by this exclusion. Hufnagel a~d Birnberg (1989) 
state that employees not involved in a decision-~king process 
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generally consider the decision to be "unfair." The 
consequences of this perceived unfairness can have unfortunate 
affects on the organization. As Thompson states, 11 Control 
systems that are perceived to be inequitable may also trigger 
a variety of unanticipated, dysfunctional behaviors as 
managers experience diminished autonomy and attempt to 
circumvent the system. 11 
Goal seven: "bt= flexible to ~ccommodate changes in 
customer and business needs 11 will not be .1.ccomplished if the 
task force working on the chargeback policy consists only of 
data processors and accountants. Data processors and 
accountants are unlikely to be aware of changes in customers 
needs. Unless a vehicle is established for comrnunica.ting 
changing needs to the chargeback policy makers, goal number 
seven will not be achieved. 
The process to establish HC&E' s chargeback policy also 
violates some of the change theory recommendations discussed 
in Chapter IV, Sections F and G. These recommendations were: 
1. Addressing ability deficiencies 
2. Addressing willingness deficiencies 
3. Ensuring cult11ral alig~ent 
4. Educating and corrununicating with affected personnel 
5. Encouraging participation and involvement in the change 
6. Facilitating and supporting personnel during the 
transition 
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7. Negotiating with personnel on the terms of the 
transition 
For example, the ability deficiencies m~ntioned in 
recommendation one exist because people do not feel 
sufficiently trained to work in the new environment. This 
feeling increases when affected personn~l have little 
influence on aspects of the new environment's structure - in 
this case the chargeback policy. Willingness deficiencies, 
too, are exacerbated when personnel are not included in 
creating a policy which will affect them. Including them in 
the decision process would have allowed them the opportunity 
to examine the facts on which the company based its decision 
to consolidate and instituce charg~udck. HC&E also viol~tcd 
recommendations three and five in instituting its chargeback 
policy. Both HC&E' s culture and change management theory 
encourage participation in the decision-making process. 
HC&E's decision to exclude groups of affected personnel may 
exacerbate resistance to the transition. 
A third weakness of HC&E's chargeback approach is the 
decision to measure usage in machine time units (CPU cycles 
and disk sectors) . As stated in Chapter II, Section B.2., 
these units are meaningless to most users. Users are not able 
to see a relationship between thetr computer use and what they 
are being charged. A more effective approach is to use 
natural billing units (e.g., number of invoices processed, 
number of checks printed, etc ... ). 
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c • HC&E I s CiiARGEBACK OBJECTIVES 
1. Incompatibility 
Some of HC&E's chargeback objectives are incompatible 
with other objectives. For example, the first objective, cost 
recovery, may preclude objective eight (mar~cet prices) and 
objective 11 (encourage use of ITC services) . Objective two, 
predictability, may be achieved at the expense of flexibility, 
objective seven. Similarly, an emphasis on cost recovery may 
make it impossible to achieve objective four, incenting 
efficient behavior using pricing structure. These 
incompatibilities make it necessary for HC&E to prioritize 
their chargeback objectives. Not all of these can be 
accomplished a.t once. 
2. No "Perfect" Chargeback Method 
No one chargeback method can accomplish all of these 
objectives. As Table one demonstrates, each method 
accomplishes some of the objectives. The chargeback methods 
diRcnRRed in Chanter III (free allocation. direct allocation. 
-- - - - • - - - -- - - - - - - .A. - • - • • 
profit based pricing, average cost pricing, standard cost 
pricing, and flexible pricing) are listed across the top of 
the table and HC&E's chargeback objectives are listed on the 
side. Some methods have been designed to accomplish a 
specific objective. These are indicated with a 11 Y11 in the box 
created by the intersection of the method and the objective. 
Other m1 'thods have the potential to satisfy a given objective 
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if other circumstances are present. These are indicated with 
a "Y/N" and require further explanation (see below) . "Unclr" 
is used to indicate that it is difficult to predict whether or 
not the chargeback method will accomplish the objective. 
Empty cells indicate that the method will not accomplish the 
objective. 
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TABLE 1. MAPPING OF CHARGEBACK OBJECTIVES TO METHODS 
-
Method FA DA PB AC SP FP 
Object.ive 
1.Recovers 
Cost y Y/N y Y/N Y/N 
2.Predictable y y 
3. Controlli:=ble Y/N Y/N Y/N Y/N 
4.Motivate 
Efficient Y/N Y/N 
Behavior 
5.Understan- y y Unclr y y y 
dab le 
6.Equjtable y Y/N Unr.lr y y y 
7.Flexible Y/N 
8.Market Price y 
9.Capacity 
Planning y Y/N 
10.Encourage 
Competition y y 
11.Encourage 
TTC!o v v TTn,-.1 r V /f\T V /f\T V /l\T 
lb- Ill ---~-- _!__ .... , ... ...., ... -1 •• _JJ 
Fh. = Free Allocation Method y = Yes 
DA = Direct Allocation Y/N Possibly 
PB :: Profit-Based Pricing Unclr Unclear 
AC = Average Cost Pricing 
SP = Standard Cost Pricing 
FP = Flexible Pricing 
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The following list is a discussion of the Y/N entries in 
Table 1. As stated above, these entries are the circumstances 
which must be present if the chargeback method is to satisfy 
the given objective. The number and letter in parentheses 
correspond to the objective and method in the table above. 
• (6, DA) Direct allocation accomplishes goal six if 
personnel consider the allocated charges "equitable. 11 
Under equitable allocation, each user receives the same 
treatment (i.e., receives an 11 equitable 11 amount of 
computer time) . 
• (1, PB) Profit-based chargeback recovers cost if the data 
center. is able to charge prices which allow cost recovery. 
• (4, PB) Profit-based chargeback motivates efficient 
behavior (i.e., encouragss individual-organizational goal 
congruence) if it is used under "perfect" market 
conditions. Under ideal market conditions, each user 
consumes computer time up to the point at whjch his/ner 
marginal cost equals his/her marginal benefit. This is 
the point of efficiency. (Point of efficiency discussed in 
Chapter III Section 3,B, (1) 
• (11, AC) Average cost pricing encourages use when prices 
are low (i.e. when recorded usage is high). The average 
cost formula (total cost of service divided by total 
usage) produces a low price when usage is high (i.e., when 
the denominator is large) . 
• (1, SP) Because the standard cost furu~id (total cost of 
service divided by total. usage) is based on projected 
costs, this method will recover costs if the projections 
used to estimate the costs are accurate. 
• (3, PB, AC, SP) Profit based, average cost, and standard 
cost pricing are controllable if the user can control his 
charges through use and the prices are not subject to 
change without notice. 
• ( 11, SP) Standard cost pricing encourages use if users 
perceive the prices to be "low" or cost effective given 
the benefits to be gained from the service. The standard 
cost pricing formula produces a per unit cost figure which 
users can compare to the benefit they receive from the 
service. 
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• ( 1, FP) Flexible pricing recovers cost if the pricing 
structure permits. The prices charged must enable the 
data center to recover its cost. 
• (3, FP) Flexible pricing is controllable if the user can 
control his charges through use and the prices are not 
subject to change without notice. 
• (4, FP) Flexible pricing motivates efficient behavior to 
the extent that use during peak times and high priority 
jobs are discouraged by higher prices. Because prices are 
higher for high priority jobs and during peak usage time, 
the users submit only jobs they value highly. 
• (9, FP) Flexible pricing ca.n provide capo.city planning 
information by charging very high prices during "peak" 
times; these high prices can signal to management. that the 
demand for available capacity is exceeding the supply. 
• (7, FP) Flexible pricing is "flexible'' (i.e. changing to 
meet changing customer needs) in the respect that it uses 
peak load and priority pricing techniques. If, for 
example, the need to run jobs at 6: 00 AM increases 
dramatically, the price of those jobs may be increased to 
rcgul~tc the dcm~nd. 
• (11, FP) Flexible pricing encourages use during off-peak 
hours. During off-peak hours the prices are lower and 
lower prices encourage use. 
D. HC&E'S CRARGEBACK POLICY 
The policy decisions HC&E has made thus far indicate tho 1~ 
some of the stated obiectivPs 
- J - - --- . -- have nri nri t-v .L-------~ over other 
objectives. Decision one, prohibiting outsourcing, implies 
that cost recovery is more important to HC&E than pricing 
computer services at their market value. Decision two, both 
requires cost recovery and stresses standard cost pricing, a 
strategy which can make cost recovery impossible. Decision 
three, which places the six ITC' s in competition with each 
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other, may motivate efficient behavior, but it may make cost 
recovery impossible across all six cente~s. 
HC&E's decision to institute a chargeback policy is also 
supported by Butler's (1992) discussion of the Sears Mortgage 
Company in Chapter VI Section D. Three of the reasons Sears 
elected not to institute a chargeback policy were: 1) their 
divisions were geographically concentrated, 2) the divisions 
were non-competitive, and 3) the company had confidence in IS. 
HC&E, on the other hand, has divisions all of the world, the 
divisions are competitive with one another, and company ~s 
concerned with the amount of money it is spending 011 IS, 
E. EPILOGUE 
The final thesis interview with HC&E' s Corporate 
Info:i:-mation Services (CIS) Comptroller was held on 15 
September 1993. As of this date, the chargeback policy is 
still causing considerctble controversy. 'The :i;.iolicy decisions 
described in Cha.pter V Section B are being implemented and 
mauy U.ivision managers their data processiilg 
charges are excessive and unfair. The Comptroller. is 
currently working on a "transition plan" v.rhich he hopes will 
remedy some of these perceived inequities ov~r the next few 
years. 
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VIII. FINDINGS AND CONCLUSION 
A. INTRODUCTION 
This thesj s' purpose was to analyze one company's approach 
to solvi~g its data processing charg8cack problems and derive 
conclusions from which DOD could benefit. This analysis was 
done in the context of the three methods by which chargeback 
is cornm')nly accompllshed: free allocation, dirc:ct allocation, 
and direct chargeback, ).ncluding profit-based pricing, average 
cost pricing, standard cost pricing, and flexibl~ pricin~. 
B. FINDINGS 
.. 
... . Unattainable Ch~rgcback rolicy ~bjectives 
HC&E' s sto.ted chargeback obj e::tives cannot al:!. bP. 
accomplished by any one of the chargc..bac}c methods dP.scribed in 
the li ter<::.ture. This means that one of Lhe two following 
things must happen: 
1. HC&E will have to prioritize jts objectives and 
selec~ tlH~ chargeback :nethod which accomplishes U1e 
largest number oi its hishest priority objectives. 
2. A new method of data processing charge:Oack must be 
created whicb.. will accomplish all of the stated 
oliject::..ve:s. 
2. Incompatible Chargebaclt Policy Objectives 
Unfortunately, bullet. two (listed above) is impossible 
Le cause seve::ral of HC&E's char.geback objectives are 
incompatible. Accomplishing one objective makes it: impossible 
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to accompJ ish others. Again, it will be necessary for HC&E to 
prioritize their chargeback objectives. 
3. The Importance of Corporate Culture and Effectively 
Managing Change 
Th~ resistance HC&E is encounterins to the proposed 
consolidation ,;_5 being exacerbated by the company's decision 
to exclude key i;:.ersonnel. This decision runs contrary to 
HC&E's corporate culture which emphasizes participation and 
disregards .:..n important tenet of change man.agement theory: 
employee participation and iuvolvement. The decision also 
runs contrary Lu Lile lJllilosophy of intervention the compzmy i::; 
using to manage the change (MOC) . The MOC philosophy 
emphasizes cultural alignment, ability deficiency, and 
willingness deficiency. Cultural alignment is not being 
achieved. Ability and willingness deficiency, both of which 
can be remedied by participation, training, and communication, 
are also not being addressed by HC&E's approach. 
4. Data Processing Chargeback: a Divisive Issue 
Both HC&E and SPI's experience with chargeback 
indicate that creating a ch~rgeback policy which will satisfy 
everyone is difficult. Each stakeholder has a different set 
oi priorities and invariably these priorities conflict. 
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C. Pertinence to DOD 
There are several things DOD can learn from both HC&E's 
experience and the analytical context discussed in tris 
thesis. DOD uses resource allocation systems designed to 
accomplish cost recovery. The unit cost system, implemented 
by DOD Principal Deputy Comptroller Donald Shycof f in fiscal 
year 1991, is based on the cost recovery concept. 11 All costs 
incurred in a functional support area are accumulatE:d to 
determL1e a total cost. The total cost is then divided by the 
total expected work load or output. The resultant cost is a. 
cost per unit of output, or the unit cost." {Seiden, 1991, p. 
23/ This cost becomes the "price" an activity pays for 
receiving a good or a service. 
Unit costing was instituted to accomplish three 
objectives: 
1. En~ourage consumers to be cost-conscious 
2. Encourage producer efficiency 
3. Encourag~ activities to 11 break even, 11 (i.e. recover 
costs) 
DOD's focus on objective three, though, makes it 
impossible for objectives one and two to be accomplished. 
Pr.ices set to recover costs do not necessariJ y encourage 
producer efficiency. (Gates, Terasawd, 1992, p.24) A second 
and related problem is that prices based purely on costs do 
not necessarily encourage consumer cost consciousness, nor can 
they be manipulated to influence consumer attitude and 
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behavior (Potter, 1986, p. 94) As discussed in Chapter II, 
Section C, Subsection 4, an effective chargeback system can be 
used to corrununicate management policy. This can only be done, 
though, if the system has sufficient flexibility. A focus on 
cost recovery, and the rigid application of billing 
algorithms, result in an inflexible chargeback syst.em which 
cannot act as a vehicl; for communicating management policy or 
user needs (Chapter II, Section c, Subsection 6). 
Another problem with the cost recovery approach is the 
method by which DOD calculates costs. DOD uses total cost as 
the basis for ~he unit costs assigned. Total costs include 
direct, indirect costs, and depreciation (Seiden, J.991, p.25). 
One of th~: criteria by which a chargeback system's merit can 
be measured is whether the charges are controllable (i.e., 
whether users can control charges through their behc1.vior) 
Neither indirect costs or depreciation are controllable. 
Another i:-otential concern surfaced during a 9 December 
1993 interview with CDR Rod Robertson, former Commanding 
Officer of NCTS (Naval Computer Telecommunicat:ions Station), 
New Orleans. DOD uses complicated billing algorithms SJ.milar 
to the one depicted in Chapter II, Section D, for its comput(~r 
and telecommunications services. Cryptic billing a.lgorithms 
are strongly discouraged by the exis~ing c'nargeback 
1. iterature. The litet"ature recorrunends instead usi.ng natural 
billing units, such as number of invoices processed or 
database queries pro::essed. As discussed in Chapte1 II, 
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Section D, the natural billing unit allows users to see a 
direct relationship between what they use and what they pay. 
Another lesson DOD can learn from this thesis pertains to 
managing maj o~-- organizational change. DOD typically 
institutes change autocratically rather than democratically. 
There ar· of course, circumstances peculiar to DOD which 
occasionally mc:.ke this method of imposing change necessary. 
There are other circumstances, though, in which DOD might 
benefit from the more "democratic" approach advocated by the 
change management literature discussed in this thesis. Two 
examples are Total Quality Leadership (TQL) and unit costing. 
DOD is currently in the process of instituting both of these 
new approaches and the changes are being resisted. The 
resistance stems in part frum the fact that DOD personnel do 
not understand why the changes are being made. As discussed 
in Chapter IV, Section D, DOD needs to communicate to 
personnel the reasons behind the change. DOD also needs to 
ensure that personnel have the skills necessary to function 
effectively in the post-~hange environment. 
DOD can learn from the mistakes HC&E's made in instituting 
its chargeback policy. As discussed previously in this 
chapter: and 
stakeholders 
in Chapter VII, HC&E 
out of the process 
elected to leave major 
which implemented its 
chargeback. l.JOlic.;y. DOD 111a.k.12s Lhi::i wi.::iLc1.ke c1.i::i well. While it 
is often impossible for DOD to include representative 
stakeholders in the policy-making process, it is not 
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impossible to involve them in implementation. Allowing 
affected personnel some control over their destinies decreases 
their resistance to the proposed change. 
D. AREAS FOR FURTHER STUDY 
This thesis suggests several areas in which further 
research might be done. 
• How is DOD establishing its own fee-for- service 
(chargeback) rela.tionship with the organizations which 
will be using the consolidated data processing centers? 
• !s there a "best-fit'' approach, i.e., can guidelines be 
established which allow a company to assess its own 
situation and select a c::1argeback method which suits its 
needs? 
• Data centers now provide more than simply maintrame 
computer processing time. Given this fact, what 
alternatives to the traditional chargeback methods can be 
proposed to charge for services such as user assistance, 
training, consultation, bulletin board availability, 
etc ... ? 
• A.dministrative overhead must be considered when selecting 
a. chargeback method. What methods can be used to quantify 
administrative overhead? 
• what are the dysfunctiuudl ~oDsequences of an 
conceived chargeback policy and how much can 
consequences cost an organization? 
~ , , 
.1. ..L .J.. -
these 
•How can an organization's culture be used to facilitate 
organizational change? 
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